The author addresses ethical issues involved in the assignment of grades and student evaluations in undergraduate courses. The author prescribes an ethical approach to grade assignment. Instructors, according to the author, should take into account various factors in grading assignment like the student's individual efforts, improvement throughout the course, the student’s general psychological state, and potential disadvantaged starting points in the educational process. Instead of basing grade assignments on judgments from arbitrary criteria or letting them be an expression of power, (...) the author suggests incorporating the variability model into the practice of grade assignment. Proper grade assignment facilitates students to be more reflective on the instructor’s feedback and to develop the ability to evaluate their own work. (shrink)

Three questions are generated by the issue of the continuity and consistency of Husserl's presentations of the reduction from his early to his last works: did Husserl himself consider these presentations to be continuous and consistent? Do the texts show these presentations to be continuous and consistent? and, Should these presentations, on philosophical grounds, have been continuous and consistent? My thesis is that all three questions can be answered affirmatively. ;I argue, first, that there is some textual evidence that Husserl (...) himself considered his presentations of the reduction to be continuous and consistent; second, that a reconstruction of the arguments for the reduction in the Ideas, Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, and Crisis shows that central elements of both the Cartesian and ontological ways are present in each of these texts; and, finally, that a full and clarified meaning for the reduction requires both Cartesian and ontological components, because each way on its own raises problems only approachable via the other way. ;In critically examining the contrary interpretations of Iso Kern, Ludwig Landgrebe, and David Carr, I respond to arguments that phenomenology is internally inconsistent in its treatment of intersubjectivity, temporality, kinaesthesia, and life-world, by showing that this conclusion rests in each case on the tacit and undefended premise that phenomenology does and must posit a founding domain that is opaque to reflection. I argue that, consistent with the transcendental concept of intentionality, these topics must be approached in terms of phenomena functioning in the experience of the reflecting philosopher. ;I conclude that phenomenology has not been demonstrated to be in principle incapable of addressing these topics, and I propose a meaning for the reduction , involving an interplay of Cartesian and ontological elements, that preserves the transcendental character of Husserl's philosophy. (shrink)